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Essay
InfrastructuralRegulation and the New Utilities
K. Sabeel Rahman'
From too-big-to-failfinancialfirms to net neutrality to internetplatforms
and the water crisis in Flint, Michigan, we nowface a variety oflegal andpublic
policy problems which all share a common structure. While covering vastly
different subject matter areas, these disputes are similar in that they all involve
the same root problem: how should law and publicpolicy operate to prevent the
arbitraryand unaccountable control over basic infrastructure?Water, finance,
internet access-these are examples of goods and services which are
foundationaland infrastructural.They are the basis upon which much economic
and social activity is built. As a result, arbitrary, exclusionary, or unfair
governance of these services poses a particularly troubling problem for
individuals, businesses, and communities. This Essay draws on the historicaland
legal traditionof public utility regulation to develop a generalizedframework
for regulatingthese kinds ofinfrastructuralgoods andservices. While the history
ofpublic utility regulationhas at times been fraught with some controversy, this
Essay (and this symposium as a whole) suggests that the public utility tradition
offers some valuable normative, legal, and institutional design insights which
can be adaptedfor a range ofcontexts in today's economy.
The Essay develops a portable method of analysis and regulationthat can
be appliedto a wide range ofcontemporarycontexts. This proposed, modernized
framework of "infrastructuralregulation"has three elements. First, I argue that
infrastructuralregulationshould be applied to goods that are infrastructural,in
that they are defined by the conditions of scale, necessity, and vulnerability.
Second, such infrastructuralgoods should be subjected to a mix of regulatory
f
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oversight, "firewalls,"and public options, which together can assurefair and
equal access to those infrastructuralgoods. Finally, the Essay suggests that the
regulatory oversight of such infrastructuralgoods must itself be constituted in
more democratically-accountableways.
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Introduction
Consider the following four regulatory policy debates of the last few years:
1.

2.

Years after the 2008 financial crisis and the implementation of major
new financial regulations aimed at addressing the problem of "too-bigto-fail" (TBTF) financial firms,' the Trump Administration has
indicated its intention to dismantle many of these regulatory limits on
the financial sector, through legislative and administrative action.2
In December 2017, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
under Chairman Ajit Pai, elevated to the chairmanship by President

1.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.). For a good overview
of the financial crisis and the major policy innovations of Dodd-Frank, see, for example, Michael S. Barr,
The FinancialCrisis and the Path ofReform, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 91 (2012).
2.
See, e.g., Zachary Warmbrodt, How the Banks Won over Washington Again,
POLITICO (Dec. 28, 2017), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/12/28/banks-trump-administrationfinancial-crisis-319382 [http://perma.cc/XF8H-8TMJ].
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3.

4.

Trump, voted to dismantle its 2015 Open Internet Order establishing
"net neutrality" regulations on Internet service providers (ISPs). 3
At the same time, Internet platforms like Google, Facebook, and
Amazon have come to be viewed as increasingly dominant actors
shaping the flows of information and commerce. This has sparked a
growing debate about whether further regulations need to be extended
to cover Internet platforms like Google, Facebook, and Amazon, either
through expanded antitrust enforcement or some "net neutrality"
equivalent to address issues of information manipulation and anticompetitive practices.
In Flint, Michigan, mismanagement of the city's water utility by state
administrators led to the tragic spike in lead contamination, creating one
of the worst lead poisoning crises in the country. The crisis in Flint is
part of a larger growing policy battle at the local level over the
privatization and mismanagement of crucial urban infrastructure
including water utilities.6

These vastly different policy areas express the same core problem: how to
regulate and govern foundational infrastructure those goods and services that
are essential, upon which much of our economic and social life are built. While
conventionally the idea of "infrastructure" might evoke images of roads and
bridges, the concept is much broader. Infrastructure also describes a wider range
of goods and services, which together operate at scale, enable widespread
downstream uses, and thus serve as foundational necessities for economic and
social life.7 Viewed through this lens, economies depend on finance and access
to credit; communities depend on water; modem business and communications
increasingly depend on both ISPs and Internet platforms like Google.
Precisely because of their vital importance, infrastructure also raises
particularly difficult challenges for public policy and regulation. We must ensure
that the infrastructure is built and provided at scale. But we must also ensure that
the actors that control and govern infrastructure, whether they be public or

3.
See In re Restoring Internet Freedom, Declaratory Ruling, Report and Order, and
Order, WC Docket 17-108 (adopted Dec. 14, 2017), http://transition.fcc.gov/DailyReleases
/DailyBusiness/2018/db0104/FCC-17-166Al.pdf [http://perma.cc/XX8C-764A]; see also infra Part III.
4.

See, e.g., Peter Coy, How to Tame Google, Facebook, Amazon,

and Apple,

BLOOMBERG (Nov. 29, 2017), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-11-29/how-to-tamegoogle-facebook-amazon-and-apple [http://perma.cc/X2S6-5XC7]; see also infra Part III.
5.
See, e.g., Merrit Kennedy, Lead-Laced Water in Flint: A Step-By-Step Look at the
Makings of a Crisis, NPR (Apr. 20, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/04/20
/465545378/lead-laced-water-in-flint-a-step-by-step-look-at-the-makings-of-a-crisis
[http://perma.cc
/64F7-KEG9].
6.
See Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118 (2014);
How PrivatizationIncreasesInequality, PUB. INTEREST (Sept. 2016), http://www.inthepublicinterest.org
/wp-content/uploads/InthePubliclnterest InequalityReport Sept20l6.pdf
[http://perma.cc/TQX3-

QW4X].
7.

See infra Part II.
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private, do so in ways that assure fair and equal access to all-and remain
ultimately accountable to the public good. The importance of infrastructure
enables potentially dangerous forms of exploitation, domination, and extraction;
by virtue of their control over the terms of access to these necessities, private or
public actors can exercise preferential treatment, impose high prices, or enact
troubling forms of discrimination and exclusion. That these concerns about
access and fairness in context of infrastructure whether the infrastructure of the
internet economy like ISPs or Google, or the infrastructure of the real economy
from Amazon's logistics and shipping empire to access to credit and finance, to
the physical infrastructure of the city are arising in a range of different contexts
suggests the need to revisit questions about how infrastructure ought to be
regulated.
There is a historical tradition of regulatory theory and practice that emerged
to address precisely these concerns: the public utility tradition. Legal historians
have recently revived interest in this tradition, documenting how late nineteenth
century lawyers and reformers innovated new legal doctrines like common
carriage, and new administrative institutions like public commissions and public
utilities, to address concerns about fairness and access to the infrastructure of the
industrial revolution: railroads, telecommunications, and the physical
infrastructure of the rapidly-developing modem city.8 In parallel to this historical
literature, a growing number of legal scholars have converged on the idea of
public utility as a way to diagnose and address the regulatory problems posed by
modem-day infrastructure, in areas as diverse as finance, healthcare, and climate
change.9 These case-specific accounts suggest that the historical public utility
tradition can have greater traction in today's economy.

8.

See WILLIAM J. NOVAK, A NEW DEMOCRACY: LAW AND THE CREATION OF THE

MODERN STATE (forthcoming 2018); William J. Novak, The Public Utility Idea and the Origins of
Modern Business Regulation, in CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 139-76 (Naomi R.

Lamoreaux & William J. Novak eds., 2017) [hereinafter Novak, The Public Utility Idea]; William J.
Novak, Law and the Social Control ofAmerican Capitalism,60 EMORY L.J. 377, 399 (2010) [hereinafter,
Novak, Law and the Social Control]; see also BARBARA FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ
FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT 160-204 (1998); RICHARD

JOHN, NETWORK NATION (2010) (describing the rise of public utility style regulation in
telecommunications in the late nineteenth century); GAIL RADFORD, THE RISE OF THE PUBLIC
AUTHORITY: STATEBUILDING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 71-87

(2013); DANIEL RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN APROGRESSIVE AGE (Cambridge
University Press 1998) 112-58 (discussing the rise of municipal utilities); infra Part I.
9.

See, e.g., MEHRSA BARADARAN,

HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS: EXCLUSION,

EXPLOITATION, AND THE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY (Harvard University Press 2015) (arguing for a "public
option" in consumer banking); William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, 61 UCLA L.
REV. 1614 (2014) (applying public utility concepts to contemporary energy regulation); Robert C. Hockett
& Saule T. Omarova, The FinanceFranchise102 CORNELL L. REV. 1143 (2017) (analyzing finance as a
public franchise); Morgan Ricks, Money as Infrastructure(on file with author) (arguing for public utilitystyle regulation of finance); Nicholas Bagley, Medicine as a Public Calling, 114 MICH. L. REV. 57 (2015)
(analyzing modern medicine as a kind of public calling subject to public utility-style restrictions) ; K.
Sabeel Rahman, The New Utilities: Private Power, Social Infrastructure, and the Revival of the Public

Utility Tradition, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) [hereinafter Rahman, The New Utilities]
(suggesting that modern forms of economic power can be analyzed through a public utility lens); K. Sabeel
Rahman, InfrastructuralExclusion and the Fight for the City: Power, Democracy, and the Case of
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This Essay sketches a generalizable, portable framework for adapting
historical public utility concepts across these different regulatory policy debates
of the current moment. The goal of this Essay is not to provide an in-depth
account of how public utility might inform any one policy debate, such as, say,
TBTF finance or the problem of water governance or intemet platforms. Rather,
this Essay aims to distill a common toolkit of core questions and regulatory
strategies that arise from the public utility tradition, and to show how these
questions, tools, and strategies can inform our approach to these diverse policy
debates today. Public utility, then, offers not a blueprint or model, but rather a
flexible method, through which we can develop more precise legal and
regulatory regimes posing this similar challenge of unaccountable or arbitrary
control over access to basic infrastructure.
The Essay proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief overview of the
historical public utility tradition. This Part suggests that rather than focusing on
specific public utility policies like rate regulation or judicial attempts to address
industries "affected by the public interest,"o we need a broader perspective of
the public utility history. The central lesson for us of this public utility history
lies in three insights. First, that public utility regulation was at its core an attempt
to address the problem of unaccountable power and control over infrastructure,
and also to assure fair and equal access to those foundational goods and services
that made social and economic life possible. Second, that the toolkit of public
utility regulation was actually quite broad and adaptable, involving a range of
interventions aimed at addressing the problem of power over infrastructure.
Third, that the category of what goods needed to be regulated in this way was
essentially fluid and changes with technology and economic conditions.
Part II then sketches an updated, modem-day framework for diagnosing
and regulating "infrastructure," inspired by this public utility tradition. This Part
highlights three specific implications for a modem-day approach to
infrastructural regulation, informed by the public utility tradition. First, we must
diagnose modem-day forms of "infrastructure" that warrant greater scrutiny.
Second, we can apply a flexible range of tools to these infrastructural contexts
in order to assure fair and equal access. Third, we must develop a governance
regime that assures that such utility-style regulation is itself administered in an
accountable and public-interested manner. Part III then applies these concepts to
a very brief discussion of some current-day policy debates as an example of how
this approach to regulating infrastructure can be deployed today.

America's Water Crisis, 53 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) [hereinafter Rahman,
InfrastructuralExclusion] (applying public utility concepts to the contemporary water access crisis in
American cities); see also infra Part III.
10.
The "public interest test" emerged in the famous case of Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S.
113 (1876), but was eventually abandoned by the Supreme Court in Nebbia v. People ofNew York, 291
U.S. 502 (1934). This is often (but wrongly) viewed as evidence of the failure of public utility ideas. See
infra Part I.
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I. Infrastructure and the Public Utility Tradition
A. Public Utility, Domination, and the Legacy ofProgressiveEra Thought
In the late-nineteenth century, the dramatic upheavals of industrialization
and the emergence of new technologies like railroads and electricity fueled an
extraordinary wave of intellectual debate and legal innovation aimed at tackling
these newfound threats to economic freedom and well-being." These pressures
informed what scholars have termed the "first law and economics movement," a
transformation of legal thought grappling with the tensions of the new
economy.12
A central concern for legal thinkers and reformers in this period was the
problem of private power particularly, the problem of the modem corporation
that had grown into more powerful actors exercising influence on workers,
markets, and society at large. For these Progressive Era legal thinkers, the
problem with such private power was that these firms increasingly exercised a
kind of quasi-sovereign power, yet were not subject to the kinds of checks and
balances that the law imposed on public state actors. Morris Cohen thus argued
that private property had to be seen as a "form of sovereignty" which ought to
be subjected to "all those considerations of social ethics and enlightened public
policy which ought to be brought to the discussion of any just form of
government."1 3 For Louis Jaffe, property and contract law represented "passing
a certain domain of Sovereignty from the state to the private employer of

labor".1 4 Louis Brandeis, a key legal thinker and later Supreme Court Justice,
framed the problem of corporate power as equivalent to the problem of political
tyranny. Large corporations represented a kind of "absolutism" that might at best
be "benevolent" but nevertheless posed a threat to liberty. As Brandeis wrote,
"there develops within the State a state so powerful that the ordinary social and
industrial forces existing are insufficient to cope with it."' 5
The most glaring examples of such quasi-sovereign private power in the
late nineteenth century took the form of giant corporate monopolies and trusts
like Standard Oil, the railroad barons, or the telecom monopolies. Such
concentrated power enabled monopolists to subdue competitors, and charge

11.

See generally MORTON KELLER, REGULATING A NEW SOCIETY (1994) (discussing

the Progressive Era and the ways in which reformers developed new approaches to regulation in response
to economic upheaval); MORTON HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW VOL. II: 1870-1960
(1992) (tracing the intellectual developments of legal realists and reformers during this period); DANIEL
T. RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS (1998) (describing the intellectual origins and dynamics of
Progressive Era reform thought and activism).
12.

See FRIED, supra note 8, at 15-28; HOVENKAMP, supra note 11, at 80.

13.
Morris Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. REV. 8, 14 (1927).
14.
Louis Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups (1937), in AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM
116 (William W. Fisher III et al. eds., 1993).
15.
Louis Brandeis, On Industrial Relations, in CURSE OF BIGNESS 73 (Osmond
Fraenkel ed. 1935).
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exploitative or extractive prices. It also troublingly enabled these firms to
exercise undue political influence as a byproduct of their enormous wealth and
economic influence.' 6 The Progressive Era critique of private power is most
famous for its creation of antitrust law, to address the problem of corporate
concentration and corporate power through breaking up powerful firms and
assuring competitive markets." But this anti-monopoly tradition encompassed
more than conventional antitrust law tools of restricting mergers or breaking up
concentrated firms. Another key manifestation of the critique of private power
lay in the emergence of public utility regulation. For a variety of reformers
especially at the state and local level, private control over essential goods and
services posed a particular threat above and beyond the ordinary dangers of
unchecked corporate power; by virtue of their control over these necessities,
these private actors had acquired a particularly threatening form of power. Left
unchecked, such private control over basic necessities meant that these private
firms could effectively subordinate, dominate, and exploit ordinary users. Where
individuals and communities were so dependent on the benevolence and
goodwill of other actors to access basic necessities of life, this constituted the
essence of unfreedom.18

The result was the innovation of a range of new regulatory tools, from legal
doctrines like common carriage to new administrative commissions to oversee
the provision and governance of these critical goods and services.' 9 These public
utility regulations offered a way to diagnose these problematic concentrations of
power, and a set of tools for assuring fair and equal access, and imposing checks
and balances on those providers. While the public utility tradition is often
dismissed as a failure of administrative rate-setting,20 the emergence of public
utility regulation represented a critical phase of state-building, as reformers and

16.
See David K. Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance ofPower, 61 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1219, 1219-20 (1987); Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PENN. L. REV.
1051 (1979).
17.
For a brief overview of antitrust politics in the early twentieth century, see supra
note 16. See also Daniel Crane, All I Really Need to Know About Antitrust I Learned in 1912, 100 IOWA
L. REV. 2025 (2014). On the Brandeis's concept of "regulated competition" as a way of understanding the
goals of antitrust law, see, for example, GERALD BERK, Louis D. BRANDEIS AND THE MAKING OF
REGULATED COMPETITION, 1900-1932 (2009). For a modem version of this concept, see, for example,
Spencer Weber Waller & Matthew Sag, PromotingInnovation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2223 (2014).
18.
For a discussion of the philosophical dimensions of freedom and domination behind
these critiques, see, for example, K. SABEEL RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION 80-88
(2016).
19.
Novak, Law and the Social Control, supra note 8, at 400. As Novak writes,
"progressives viewed the law of public utilities as a vibrant and expansive arena for experimenting with
unprecedented governmental control over business, industry, and market." Id. at 399-400; see also Novak,
The Public Utility Idea, supra note 8, 140-41 (describing the history of the public utility idea and how it
drove the innovation of modern administrative governance); Bagley, supra note 9, at 71-77 (describing
the emergence of public callings doctrine as part of this public utility tradition); Boyd, supra note 9, at
1636-50 (describing the intellectual emergence of the public utility idea).
20.
See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876) (defining the "affected by the public
interest" test for public utility regulation); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (abandoning that
test as unworkable).
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policymakers innovated the institutions, tools, and practices that would become
the modem administrative state. The state and city chartering of public utilities
had become a widespread practice developed in the Progressive Era to regulate
the provision of various goods and services, extending far beyond contemporary
usage limited to industries like water, electricity, and gas to encompass
everything from transportation and telecommunications to milk, fuel, and
banking.2' Public utility reformers expressed an overarching moral and political
concern with those instances where a vital necessity for social and economic
inclusion and well-being was being provided in a way that was inequitable,
unfair, and most troublingly, subject to the arbitrary whims of powerful actors.
Consider a very early example of the emerging public utility critique of
private power over foundational goods and services: the 1858 Wisconsin case of
Shepard v. Milwaukee Gas Light Company.22 In this case, the plaintiff
challenged the activities of a private gas company operating under city charter
to provide lighting to the town. When he asked for gas for his store which was
already connected to the main gas line, Milwaukee Gas Light Company refused.
The Court found this refusal to be impermissible. According to the court, while
the company "has full right to govern itself," it had "no right to govern the people
at large, whether their dwellings happen to be lighted with oil or gas."23 The
private company was fully capable of making its own rules and regulations for
conditions of service, it could not be "the sole judge of the propriety of these
regulations."24 Furthermore, those rules and regulations "must be reasonable,
just, lawful, not capricious, arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable. Were it not
so, the whole network of pipes and machinery would be at the mercy of the
careless, the fraudulent or the malignant." 25
The language of this decision is indicative. The central the problem is that
control over a foundational necessity for the social and economic life of the town,
gas, is in the private hands of the gas company. This control, and the importance
of the good itself, places the users, like the plaintiff here, in a unique position of
vulnerability and potential subjugation. That the court evokes the language of
governance and arbitrary rule highlights the degree to which this problem is
viewed not just as a substantive matter of gas policy, but rather as a political
problem of accountability. Nor is this dynamic unique to just gas. As the court
notes, gas itself only recently became important enough to warrant this degree
of public scrutiny. As the court notes:

21.
Novak, Law and the Social Control, supra note 8, at 400 ("For progressive legal
and economic reformers, the legal concept of public utility was capable of justifying state economic
controls ranging from statutory police regulation to administrative rate setting to outright public ownership
of the means of production."); see also Boyd, supra note 10, at 1619.
22.
Shepard v. The Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 6 Wis. 539 (1858).
23.
Id. at 542.
24.
Id. at 543.
25.
Id. at 548.

918

Infrastructure Regulation and the New Utilities
The successful operation of this gas company worked a radical change in the
mode of lighting the streets, dwellings, and places of business in the city, and
created thereby a sort of necessity for the article, to produce which, the exclusive
privilege was conferred upon them, and hence they assumed the correlative duty
26
of supplying this necessity.

Gas works, electricity, and streetcars-these mainstays of modem urban
infrastructure were in the late nineteenth century the forefront of public utility
politics, motivating many of the leading Progressive Era actors from thinkers and
lawyers like Louis Brandeis to politicians like Cleveland Mayor Tom Johnson,
who saw municipalization and regulation infrastructure as central to achieving a
more equitable balance of power between private and public actors. 27 The
concern was not limited to gas and electric utilities; rather these were simply the
most glaring examples of a wider concern over the potential for arbitrary power
and abuse that arises when actors concentrate control over basic necessities upon
which many depend, but lacking in alternative providers or other forms of checks
and balances.
Take another example: the emergence of "common carriage" regulations
for utilities like railroads, premised on the old common law tradition of "public
callings" for innkeepers and the like. For Progressive Era public utility theorists,
the issue in the innkeeper analogy was not that inns represented some kind of
intrinsically invaluable good central to human flourishing. Rather, the issue was
that under particular circumstances, the innkeeper possessed a problematic
concentration of power in his or her capacity to deny shelter to a traveler who, at
that particular moment, is rendered vulnerable by the sheer necessity of shelter
while on the road. Thus, Bruce Wyman, one of the leading public utility theorists
described the common carriage duty to serve all comers in the following terms: 28
When the weary traveler reaches the wayside inn in the gathering dusk, if the host
turn him away what shall he do? Go on to the next inn? It is miles away, and the
roads are infested with robbers. The traveler would be at the mercy of the
innkeeper, who might practice upon him any extortion, for the guest would submit
to anything almost, rather than be put out into the night. Truly a special law is
required to meet this situation, for the traveler is so in the hands of the innkeeper
29
that only an affirmative law can protect him.

By contrast, the traveler who seeks lodging in the heart of town is in an
"altogether different" situation for "there are shops in plenty and he has time to
choose". The regulatory demand, then, arises not from some intrinsic meaning
26.

Id. at 547.

27.
See, e.g., DANIEL RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A
PROGRESSIVE AGE 145 (1998); GAIL RADFORD, THE RISE OF THE PUBLIC AUTHORITY: STATEBUILDING
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 75 (2013).

28.

Bruce Wyman, The Law of The Public Callings as a Solution of the Trust Problem,

17 HARV. L. REV. 156 (1903).

29.

Id. at 159.
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of "inns", but rather from the context-specific configuration of power between
service providers and end users. Market conditions and other external factors can
thus move a good in and out of the category of "common calling".
These common law traditions of common carriage or public callings had
played a large role in the regulation of highways, rivers, or inns. For Progressive
Era thinkers, these concepts offered a way to ensure fair and equal access to the
new modem-day forms of infrastructure, such as electricity and
telecommunications. 3' Indeed, the public utility framework was surprisingly
flexible and spread widely, deployed in context of goods and services ranging
electricity and transport to goods and services like banking, milk, ice, water, and
much more. 32 The category of public utility was an expansive one, encompassing
a wide range of goods and services. For public utility thinkers and reformers, this
fluidity of the concept was one of its strengths, for they recognized that as goods
became more vital and as their modes of production and provision became more
concentrated, they might warrant such stringent oversight where previously none
had been required.33
However, in seeking to remedy the problem of private power, the public
utility reform agenda at its core was not just a suite of specific substantive
policies, but rather a broader ethos of innovating new systems of democratic
governance. Across these different types of goods and specific policy regimes,
the common thread is the need to create checks and balances that, not unlike the
checks and balances of our public constitutional system, would enable the
accountability and contestation of concentrated private control. This institutional
and process oriented contribution of the public utility vision was at times
obscured by the focus on substantive policies themselves, from utility rate setting
to common carriage. But it is this spirit of institutional innovation, more so than
the specific policy designs themselves, that represent the lasting and most
revolutionary outcome of the public utility and Progressive Era view of
domination and power.34
"30

30.
Id. at 160.
31.
See, e.g., id. (describing public callings and common carriage traditions around
innkeepers as a template for addressing the problems of early twentieth century public utilities).
32.
See Novak, Law and the Social Control, supra note 8, at 399-401.
33.
See, e.g., New State Ice Co v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). In this case, the Supreme Court rejected an Oklahoma attempt to regulate ice production as a
necessity. Brandeis' dissent is indicative of the public utility tradition style of analysis that had been
central in the decades prior. Brandeis argued that Oklahoma was justified in viewing ice as a necessity,
for private individuals were capable of manufacturing their own ice, the structure of production lent itself
to a monopoly. Id. at 287-95. As Brandeis argued in his dissent, "the conception of public utility is not
static." Id. at 285
34.
See Boyd, supra note 9, at 1619 (noting that the public utility idea was a broader
ethos rather than a specific set of policies); Novak, The Public Utility Idea, supra note 8
173-76
(emphasizing how public utility thinkers and bureaucrats lay the foundation for modern-day democratic
governance); Rahman, The New Utilities, supranote 9 (drawing out the institutional implications ofpublic
utility thought for modern-day forms of monopoly power); RAHMAN, supra note 18 (interpreting the
democratic theory implicit in Progressive Era critiques of economic power).
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The importance of governance and checks and balances is underscored by
the ways in which public utility thinkers calibrated the scope of their proposals.
As Walton Hamilton, a Yale economist and lawyer, put it, only some goods and
services would warrant more stringent public utility style oversight: when the
goods and services themselves were essential necessities, and where the existing
forms of market competition and public oversight on their own were insufficient
to protect against abuses and assure accountability. Thus, Hamilton argued that
industries that produce "non-essentials" and could safely be left to the regular
checks and balances of market competition, while those like coal and steel that
were characterized by "distinctive groups of customers"-Clear segments of the
population like workers, producers and consumers who could self-mobilize to
provide countervailing checks and balances were similarly untroubling.
Instead, he was concerned about industries like railroads and electrical power
that were "linked with all the activities of the economic order" and therefore
"demand large social oversight," whether by outright public ownership or by the
stringent regulation of an administrative commission.3 5 By creating new
regulatory bodies, reformers made it more possible to act on these seemingly
powerful and diffuse forces of economic power and inequality. By situating these
bodies in a larger context of public-oriented, democratic politics, these agencies
could fairly be seen as agents of the public good. As one contemporary reformer
noted, "publicness" of the "public utility" concept is the result of both the
"circumstances on the one hand and the response to them, in terms of law . .. on
the other".36 In fact, the very idea of a "natural monopoly" to begin with emerged
out of the efforts of Progressive Era thinkers like Richard Ely to justify greater
government oversight for a fluid, shifting category of goods that posed particular
dangers of concentrated control.3 7
Crucially, these common law concepts were adapted not just by courts, but
more importantly by reformers creating new administrative and regulatory
bodies. A key front-line lay in battles over the regulation of railroads, the new
infrastructure of the industrial economy. While courts played a large role in the
battles over the Interstate Commerce Act and the emergence of railroad
regulation of fair rates and nondiscrimination, 38 states like Wisconsin created
new regulatory commissions to enforce obligations for universal service,
reasonable rates, and accounting standards. 39 City-level reformers similarly
drove a wave of "municipalization", converting private control over electricity,
transportation, water, and more into public provision-or tightly regulated

35.
Walton Hamilton, The Control ofBig Business, NATION, May 25, 1932.
36.
Gustavus H. Robinson, The Public Utility Concept in American Law, 41 HARV. L.
REV. 277, 279 (1928).
37.
See JOHN, supra note 8, at 158, 165, 195-96.
38.
See, e.g., Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 145 U.S. 263
(1892).
39.
Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, supranote 9, at 1641-42.
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private provision.40 Thus, while the public utility concept as a judicial doctrine
eventually faded from view with courts abandoning the "affected by the public
interest" requirement for applying public utility regulations, 4 ' this is misleading,
for the judicial retreat from public utility represented the flip side of a
widespread establishment of administrative bodies that, starting with public
utility regulations, had grown into the apparatus for what we now think of as
ordinary business and market regulation.42
B. From Public Utility as Model to Public Utility as Method
These glimpses are indicative of a larger normative theory implicit in the
public utility tradition, and worth recovering to inform our current thinking on
public goods and inequality.
First, note how these thinkers identified the problem not in terms of a set
list of intrinsically valuable public utilities. Rather, the list of basic necessities
demanding more stringent regulatory oversight is a context-specific judgment
based on the problem of arbitrary, unchecked power. These goods were already
being provided by real entities on the ground. The problem was that they were
being provided on unequal and arbitrary terms, without sufficient checks and
balances to assure equal access or fairness.
Second, these judgments are necessarily fluid ones that depend on mapping
the empirical context of the good or service in question, paying particular
attention to mapping the power disparities and relationships involved. As
Brandeis put it in a particularly famous dissent in the case of New State Ice v.
Liebmann,4 3 "the conception of public utility is not static."44 In the opinion,
Brandeis sought to defer to the Oklahoma legislature, which had chartered a state
utility for the production of ice. The majority rejected Oklahoma (and Brandeis')
view that ice constituted a necessity warranting exclusive state licensing and
chartering of production, precluding private competitors like Liebmann. In one
sense, the case stands for the judicial move away from the public utility concept
presaging cases like Nebbia.45 Indeed, the dispute between Brandeis' dissent and
the majority can be read as an example of the difficulty of determining whether
a good ought to be treated as a public utility or not. While the majority
acknowledged the general police powers of states to protect consumers and to

40.
See, e.g., DANIEL RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A
PROGRESSIVE AGE 145 (1998); GAIL RADFORD, THE RISE OF THE PUBLIC AUTHORITY: STATEBUILDING
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA75 (2013).

41.
This trajectory is usually seen as animating the line of cases stretching from Munn
v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877) (defining the public interest test), to Nebbia v. New York, 29 U.S. 502
(1934) (abandoning the previous doctrinal frameworks for a deferential standard of review).
42.
Novak, The Public Utility Idea, supranote 8, at 173-6.
43.
285 U.S. 262 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
44.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. at 285.
45.
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (abandoning that test as unworkable).
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establish public utilities of this sort,46 they disagreed that ice production was
sufficiently affected by the public interest to warrant such extensive regulation.
For the majority, ice may have been a necessity, but it was one that was
increasingly made with ease by ordinary people with more widespread access to
electricity. 47 For Brandeis, by contrast, ice qualified as a necessity, and though
private individuals were capable of manufacturing their own ice, the structure of
production lent itself to a monopoly. 48
But in another sense, the entire opinion, majority and dissent, is indicative
of the value of the public utility framework as a methodology. While the
disagreement is phrased in the case in terms of economic distinctions around
home versus monopoly production, both opinions share a common language
around the problem of contestation and domination. For the majority, their
emphasis on the viability of home production of ice and their de-emphasis of ice
as a vital necessity function as ways to defuse the fear of domination because
individuals are no longer dependent on a single provider, nor do they need the
good itself to be full members of the polity and economy. Brandeis, by contrast,
offers a typically thoroughly empirical brief sharing the Oklahoma legislature's
concern that ice production continued to exhibit both a problematic disparity of
power between producers and users, and a uniquely important necessity given
the context of 1930s Oklahoma. 49 The deploying of public utility concepts is thus
a highly context-specific enterprise, requiring a mapping of the empirical uses of
the good, and the ecosystem of producers and power centers that might create
potential problems of domination. 0 The focus on power and domination, then,
is a method, not a slogan, a way of diagnosing the points of the modem economy
most in need of regulatory intervention.
This historical, institution-building legacy of the public utility tradition is
important. The ideas of public utility reformers also have relevance today. At its
core, public utility thought suggests that not all forms of arbitrary control are
equally dangerous; where unchecked power has concentrated over vital
necessities, these instances pose a more critical threat to social welfare and wellbeing, and thus require more stringent regulatory oversight. The central question,
as these reformers suggest, is not just whether a good is produced on

46.
47.
48.

Liebmann, 285 U.S., at 277-78.
Id. at 278.
Id. at 287-95.

49.
It is also worth noting that while this case is usually referenced for the proposition
of judicial deference to federalist experimentation at the state level, a closer read of the case itself reveals
that the central dispute is really a substantive one in the public utility vein: a battle over the problem of
power and domination in context of a set of goods that might be seen as necessities.
50.
Notably, Brandies' other famous interventions have a similar context-specificity to
them. Pamphlets like his famous Other People'sMoney are often referenced today as a mobilizing slogan.
But the work itself is an exhaustively researched piece of muckraking journalism and empirical analysis,
as Brandeis maps out the ways in which railroad and financial power operates and interconnects in the
modern economy. The purpose of this is to surface the underlying nodes of private power, to motivate and
inform the design of public policy targeted at these on-the-ground disparities of power. See Louis
BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY-AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT (1913).
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monopolistic terms, but rather whether it is a vital necessity and whether the
unchecked control over access to the good threatens values of equality and
potential for economic and social vitality. 5' This regulatory oversight, in tum,
could take a variety of forms, including administrative oversight, outright public
ownership and provision, and more.
Yet it is also true that the specific legal and institutional forms that
protections for access to basic necessities took in the Progressive Era have their
limits. First, as even contemporary scholars noted, there is a risk that once public
utility regulations are established, they might be leveraged by incumbent firms
to prevent challenges from new entrants.52 Second, public utility theorists placed
a great deal of faith in new public institutions such as administrative agencies.
Today, we lack such optimism, with very real concerns about the regulatory
accountability, ineffectiveness, or the risk of capture. Third, the problem of
access to necessities is not so easily solved by focus on common carriage of
monopolistic providers. While public utility thinkers limited their concerns in
particular to monopoly and concentrated private control over basic services like
the railroads, their concern with necessity and access to basic goods implies the
need to address more systemic and diffused forms of inequality and exclusion.53
Public utility does not offer an exact formula or blueprint, but it does
suggest a method, of mapping the ecosystem of actors that mediate access to a
key good. These actors together constitute a larger system of provision, which
has to be administered and governed with the right kinds of oversight institutions
and strategies to ensure its accountability and efficacy as a whole. 54 Public utility

51.
See, e.g., Joseph Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private
Property, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1283, 1292, 1404-12 (1996) (critiquing the conventional view of
nondiscrimination and common carriage norms as applying only in context of monopoly providers, and
arguing for a more generalized "anti-feudal" principle of nondiscrimination in all public
accommodations).
52.
See, e.g., Horace Gray, Passing of the Public Utility Concept, 16 J. LAND & PUB.
UTILITY ECON. 8, 15 (194) ("The public utility concept "originated as a system of social restraint designed
primarily, or at least ostensibly, to protect consumers from the aggressions of monopolists; it ended as a
device to protect the property, i.e., the capitalized expectancy, of these monopolists from the just demands
of society, and to obstruct the development of socially superior institutions.").
53.
See, e.g., Joseph Singer, The Anti-Apartheid Principle in American PropertyLaw,
1 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 91 (2011); Singer, supra note 51 (critiquing the conventional view of
nondiscrimination and common carriage norms as applying only in context of monopoly providers, and
arguing for a more generalized "anti-feudal" principle of nondiscrimination in all public
accommodations). Indeed, as we will see in Part III, infra, the public utility idea has in some ways
facilitated more subtle and sinister forms of exclusion, assuring public access to goods and services like
parks and municipal utilities, but restricting the "public" that can access these goods in ways that fostered
racial segregation and racial disparities.
54.
This view of "systems" of provision has itself been the subject of recent legal theory
and inquiry. In a recent Article, Sara Mayeux offers a critique over how such a "systemic" view in the
criminal justice context can be misleading, evoking a mechanical metaphor that overstates the hydraulic
connections between different actors. See Sara Mayeux, The Idea of the CriminalJustice System, 44 AM.
J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2018). Nevertheless, the idea of a system can be helpful to define a domain of
governance, politics, and contestation. Indeed, many of the advocacy groups and social movements
engaging in these questions of infrastructure, basic necessities, and inequality in the city themselves take
on a systemic lens as a way to contest the larger patterns of law and policy beyond individualized legal
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as method suggests that we approach the problem of access to basic necessities
by zeroing in on those goods and services marked by particularly troubling
disparities of power, where the combination of the downstream uses and
importance of the good and the concentration of arbitrary authority on the part
of providers or gatekeepers to the good creates an undue risk of domination.
II. Adapting the Public Utility Framework for Regulating Modem
Infrastructure
The brief historical account of public utility in Part I above indicates that
the public utility tradition does offer the beginnings of a more flexible conceptual
framework. The example of railroad rate commissions represents but one
manifestation of public utility concepts. The public utility tradition, at its heart,
is animated by two central insights which, as will be argued below, can in turn
inform a more flexible modem day regulatory approach to a wider range of
"infrastructural" goods and services.
First, the public utility tradition's central concern is with goods and services
that comprise "necessities": the businesses that affected the public interest such
that they warrant more stringent regulatory oversight are those that "met an
important human need" and that "presented the risk of oppression."55 Necessity,
on this view, involves not just "bare survival" but broader concerns of
"dependence, expectation, and reliance."56 This broad view of necessity implies
a flexible, and similarly broad, set of goods and services that might fall under the
rubric of "necessity," raising greater regulatory concem.
Second, where businesses had acquired control over the provision of and
terms of access to basic necessities, this quasi-sovereign power over users had to
be held accountable. If the idea of "necessity" opens up the domain of businesses
potentially subject to public utility style oversight, this idea of contestability
similarly opens up the kinds of approaches that such oversight could take.
Indeed, contestability and accountability might well be assured by other means,
in which case public utility regulation may not be as necessary. For example, if
market competition is robust enough, that may be sufficient to assure protection
for end users through competitive pressures between rival service providers. But
where such checks and balances are lacking or insufficient, greater oversight
might be required.
These broad ideas of necessity and contestability give us a starting point for
imagining a more flexible and modem adaptation of public utility concepts for
addressing a wide range of regulatory problems arising from infrastructural
goods and services. Specifically, a modem-day version of public utility policy

focus on 'bad actors.' See Amna Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018).
55.
Bagley, supra note 9, at 75.
56.
Id. at 76.
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strategies would have to address three questions: first, what goods and services
warrant more stringent oversight; second, what kinds of tools and regulations
would such stringent oversight consist of; and third, how would we ensure that
such oversight is itself implemented in an accountable and responsive way?
The rest of this Part sketches out some generalizable responses to these
questions to articulate a modem-day framework. Part III then applies this
framework to explain some major current regulatory policy debates today.
A. Defining "Infrastructural"Goods and Services
As I have suggested elsewhere, the historical public utility tradition is best
understood today as applying to infrastructuralgoods and services. 5 ' Like the
railroads of a century ago, where goods and services came to play a critical role
as the foundations of economic and social activity, control over these
infrastructures today raises the same concerns about domination and arbitrary
power that animated public utility reformers. We can identify infrastructural
goods and services as those that are characterized by three related but distinct
features.
First, infrastructure arises where there might be some form of economies
of scale in production. This need not take the form of the classic economist's
notion of public goods that are non-rival and non-excludable, with high sunk
costs and high barriers to entry. It might also arise in industries where there are
increasing returns through the form of network effects.5' Thus, the similar
incentives towards monopoly production that might arise in a traditional utility
context of, say, electricity, might also emerge in context of network effects
shaping the rise of dominant information platforms like Google or Facebook.59
The second defining characteristic of social infrastructure is the degree to
which the good or service unlocks a wide range of downstream uses. As Brett
Frischmann argues, the value of infrastructure in general largely derives from
the kinds of activities that the good itself enables. Infrastructural goods, on
Frischmann's account, are then input into a wide array of activities, goods, and
services that actors relying on the infrastructure might develop. As Frischmann
explains, infrastructure can be understood as those inputs that "enable, frame,
and support a wide range of activities." 60 This "demand-side" view of
infrastructure shifts our orientation not towards the production of the good itself,

57.
This Section draws on some of my previous work. See Rahman, The New Utilities,
supranote 9 at 120-128.
58.
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59.
On the utility-ness of information platforms, see infra Part III. See also FRANK
PASQUALE, BLACK Box SOCIETY (2015); Rahman, The New Utilities, supra note 9, at 148-55.
60.
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but instead towards the kinds of uses and the kinds of dependencies-the good
engenders.
This foundational nature of infrastructural goods points to the third
characteristic of social infrastructure: the risk of vulnerability to private power
or domination. As Progressive Era reformers rightly understood, where a good
or service is foundational, constituting a vital input into a wide range of social
and economic activities, unchecked control over that good places downstream
users in a highly vulnerable position, at risk of exploitation, extractive pricing,
or arbitrary exclusion. Precisely because of the importance of the good or
service, control over the provision of or access to these goods or services create
what Joseph Fishkin calls a "bottleneck," a legal and social structure that restricts
access to resources critical to enabling economic opportunity and freedom.6' The
capacity of the service provider to discriminate, exclude, or otherwise exploit
users from accessing a necessity places those users in a position of subordination.
This ability to exclude also can arise both in clear cases where a firm dominates
the provision of a particular good, and in more subtle forms where some actors
control the terms of access to a valuable networked good.62
This view of infrastructure is also, importantly, fluid. A good or service
might acquire infrastructural qualities over time. Internet access in the battle over
net neutrality (as we will see below) represents a good example of this: Thirty
years ago, Internet access could be rightly considered a luxury good, but today
it is increasingly understood to be a critical necessity for access to economic
opportunity and the modem digital public sphere. Similarly, we can imagine
infrastructural goods that by contrast lose their infrastructural nature over time.
A good that required heavy investments and scale effects in its early emergence
might well become a more normal competitive market good as production
technologies change. Indeed, Progressive Era reformers saw a number of
consumer goods as public utilities in the early twentieth century, where
production technologies had not yet advanced very far. Today, we would not
consider ice or milk to require public utility regulation (although we do subject
consumer goods to the kinds of ordinary regulation that Progressive Era reforms
made possible). But under a different economic and technological context, these
goods might well be marked by more dangerous forms of concentrated control.
B. Regulatory Tools for Checking InfrastructuralPower
If a good or service is infrastructural, what then follows? Rather than
cutting directly to a full-blown public utility model of rate regulation and
oversight, the concerns about accountability of the providers of necessities can
be met through a range of regulatory tools.

61.

JOSEPH FISHKIN,
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62.

See DAVID GREWAL, NETWORK POWER 20-43, 63-69 (2009).
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1. Regulatory Oversight
First, regulatory agencies can exercise oversight of infrastructural goods
and services. In particular, such oversight could take the form of affirmative
obligations to provide services to marginalized or overlooked constituencies, or
to comply with legal standards of nondiscrimination. This has been one of the
central legacies of public utility thought and innovation. Take the example of
telecommunications. In the early twentieth century, ideas of common carriage
and public utility initially applied to telegraph services through judicial review,63
and were later codified into the Communications Act of 1934. The Act
institutionalized public obligations for telecommunications firms that held
themselves out as serving the public at large whether or not they were forprofit, and whether or not they actually serviced the entire public.64 Courts
argued that these businesses were thus quasi-public in character, owing a
"stricter duty of care," because they had "implicitly accepted a sort of public
trust." 65 Title II of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 adapted traditional

concepts of public utility to the new telecom reality, seeking to ensure this
balance between universal access and market competition by imposing common
carrier requirements on telecom services-including the requirement of serving
all customers, 66 having just and reasonable rates, 67 prohibiting unjust or
unreasonable discrimination, 68 and requiring that each carrier establish physical
connections with other carriers. 69 The act empowered the FCC with broad
authority to oversee the industry, investigate complaints, and enforce these
obligations.70
2. Firewalls and Structuralist Regulation
However, regulatory oversight raises some difficulties of its own. First,
regulators might simply fail to detect or remedy problematic exercises of power
over access to infrastructure. As a good becomes more vital and important, the
social costs of such under-enforcement increase. Second, regulators themselves
may lack the capacity to oversee complex infrastructural systems. Limited
regulatory capacity, in the form of funding, resources, personnel, and technical
skill, represents a chronic problem for agencies seeking to implement regulations
effectively. It also makes regulators vulnerable to interest group influence, as the
regulated industries themselves can limit regulatory oversight through their
63.
64.

W. Union Tel. Co. v. Call Publ'g Co., 181 U.S. 92 (1901)
See Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. F.C.C., 525 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir.

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 641-42.
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C.
Id.
Id.
Id.

70.

See id. §§ 204, 205, 208, 215.

1976).

928

§ 201(a)

(2018).

Infrastructure Regulation and the New Utilities
control of information that the regulators need to implement regulatory
standards." Third, firms premised on the provision of infrastructural goods and
services may have stronger incentives to push back on such regulatory oversight,
working more aggressively to prevent, dismantle, or coopt regulators.
Given these difficulties, infrastructural goods and services might be better
regulated through a different form of oversight: what we might term structuralist
regulations. In the public utility tradition, some of the key regulatory
interventions involved attempts to transform the corporate structures of the firms
themselves providing these infrastructural goods as a way to preempt
exploitative or exclusionary treatment by reducing potential conflicts of interest.
Thus, historically financial regulations have often imposed limits on the kinds of
risk-taking investments that cash depositories can participate in, effectively
"firewalling" riskier forms of finance away from the core banking system; this
compartmentalization reduced the dangers of unstable and exploitative core
banking services and limited the potential contagion of financial busts.72
Similarly, antitrust reformers in the nineteenth century worried particularly about
the ways in which railroad companies might fuse with financial interests or other
producers creating a potential for self-dealing.73 In the electric utility context,
Congress passed the Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA) in 1935,
aimed at preventing financial interests from concentrating control over electrical
utilities through hidden investment vehicles and corporate structuring
arrangements. 4 The concern with Net Neutrality is a similar one, that the firms
controlling the infrastructure of the internet might have the ability to self-deal,
favoring their own content or paid content and blocking rival competitors.
These various examples of regulation are structuralist in the sense that they
target not the surface-level conduct of the infrastructural firm at the level of

71.

See, e.g., Nolan McCarty, Complexity, Capacity, and Capture, in PREVENTING

REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW To LIMIT IT 99-123 (Daniel Carpenter

& David Moss eds. 2014) (describing how complexity creates an epistemic dependence of regulators on
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for special interest influence limiting regulatory effectiveness); see also Dan Awrey, Complexity,
Innovation, and the Regulation of Modern FinancialMarkets, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 277 (2012); K.
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Experimentation in the 2010 FinancialReform and Oil Spill Statues, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 555, 571
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IT (Frederick A Stokes ed., 1913).
74.
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See infra Part III.
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individual transactions; but instead seek to alter the corporate structure of the
firm itself as a way to prophylactically reduce the propensity towards
problematic transactions in the first place. These structural limits might take the
form of "firewalls" that cordon off the basic and stable core service from riskier
or more unstable alternatives-as in the case of the separation of investment or
commercial banking.76 The limits may take the form of conflict-of-interest
requirements such as preventing the fusion of content producers and
communications infrastructure firms. Or it might take the form of financial
regulations that limit the kinds of funding and investment regimes that are
permitted for infrastructural firms, as in the case of PUHCA.
Structuralist regulation of this sort is advantageous in the infrastructure
context, because it allows regulators to focus their scarce regulatory capacities
to the root drivers of exploitative, extractive, or exclusionary control over
infrastructure. Moving regulatory focus "upstream" from specific transactions
can thus help head off multiple instances of harmful transactions, reducing the
overall likelihood of harm.
3. Public Options
Third, we might pursue a range of options through which public actors
themselves directly provide the good or service in question. Certainly, this might
include outright nationalization, municipalization, or public provision but it
need not. A public role in providing an infrastructural good might also take the
form of a "public option" where a governmental provider competes alongside
private providers, offering a simple, "plain vanilla" version of the service. Public
options combine the virtues of both public provision and competitive provision:
a plain vanilla public option would be controlled by non-profit public actors
charged with obligations to serve all comers in a nondiscriminatory fashion, and
to affirmatively provide its goods and services to under-served or marginalized
constituencies. At the same time, private alternatives can still exist on the
market but would face competitive pressure from the baseline public option.
Public options are already widespread in public policy, often hidden from view.
Where an infrastructural good or service is under the control of a private actor,
public options could be used more widely to assure access and accountability.

76.
See, e.g., Prasad Krishnamurthy, Reviving Glass-Steagall?(forthcoming) (draft on
file with the author).
77.
Adam Levitin & Susan Wachter, The Public Option in HousingFinance(Geo. Pub.
Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series No. 1966550, 2012). See also Robert Hockett & Saule
Omarova, 'Private' Means to 'Public' Ends: Governments as Market Actors (UNC Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 2222444, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2222444
[http://perma.cc/6WEL-QXTJ].
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C. Infrastructureand Governance
But while Progressive Era reformers may have had a greater sense of
optimism about the possibilities of government oversight, today's regulators
operate in a vastly different environment, one of prevailing skepticism and
unease about the efficacy and accountability of public actors." Indeed, failures
of access to infrastructure can just as easily arise in context of public actors that
have imposed burdensome bureaucratic hurdles to access-a chronic concern
long noted among poverty law scholars.79 At the same time, the above regulatory
strategies for assuring fair and equal access to infrastructural goods and services
depend in large part on the effectiveness and accountability of public actors
themselves. Regulatory capture and regulatory failure remain endemic concerns
in public law scholarship and necessarily inform institutional and policy design
questions around regulation. 0 A crucial dimension of modem-day infrastructure
regulation, then, will have to address these questions of regulatory capacity and
accountability.
At the local level, there had been a short-lived attempt to establish electoral
accountability for regional utilities and special districts, such as state-chartered
water utilities. But under constitutional doctrines, these utilities have limited
powers and geographic scope, and are therefore not obligated to accord voting
or participation rights to end users.8 ' These holdings seem to run counter to a
string of precedents extending the one-person-one-vote requirement to all
affected residents of other state-chartered local bodies that exercised "public
functions," such as school boards.82 As these cases indicate, courts have
distinguished these different local entities in terms of the scope of their
authority special districts, according to the courts, exercise more limited

78.
On this transition from a pre-New Deal optimism about regulation to a modern-day
skepticism, see, for example, DANIEL RODGERS, AGE OF FRACTURE (Belknap Press 2011), and Daniel T.
Rodgers, Book Review, Moocher Class Warfare, DEMOCRACY J. (2012), http://democracyjournal.org
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Lipsky, BureaucraticDisentitlementin Social Welfare Programs, 58 SOC. SERV. REV. 3 (1984).
80.
For a recent overview of regulatory capture concerns and remedies, see, for
example, PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT
365 (Daniel Carpenter & David Moss eds., 2013).
81.
See Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981) (declining to extend one-person-one-vote to
Arizona special district); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973)
(declining to extend one-person, one-vote to a water storage district); Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Mgmt.
Ass'n, 158 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 1998); Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person! One Vote and
Local Governments, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 339 (1993).
82.
See Kramer v. Union Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (requiring extension
of franchise to all residents of a school board area, including those without children); Avery v. Midland
Cty., 390 U.S. 474 (1968) (extending one-person-one-vote to Texas Commissioners Court); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (establishing the one-person-one-vote standard); Fumalaro v. Chi. Bd. of
Educ., 142 Ill. 2d 54 (1990) (requiring one-person-one-vote for all residents in a school system on grounds
that all were affected by the authority of the school board).
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functions and scope of authority and thus need not be saddled with the oneperson-one-vote requirement.8 3
But legislatures can design these regulatory bodies and these public utility
agencies in ways that institutionalize more systematic and flexible-internal
checks and balances. Public law scholars have proposed various forms of
consumer, user, or stakeholder representation though advisory bodies, or through
dedicated consumer representative offices; these measures could be easily
incorporated into the design of administrative bodies charged with overseeing
vital infrastructure.84 Participatory governance scholars have also shown
examples and suggested legal structures to enable the systematic participation of
stakeholders in collaborative governance arrangements, which could similarly
be adapted in these utility and infrastructure contexts.
This Part has outlined a general framework for conceptualizing the
regulation of infrastructure today. Where goods and services have acquired
extensive scale, providing a necessity, and creating a potential for abuse, greater
regulatory checks and balances are required to ensure that the public at large can
access the benefits of these critical goods and services without being vulnerable
to exploitation, exclusion, or mistreatment by those controlling the infrastructure
itself. These protections can be achieved through a variety of tools: oversight,
structuralist regulations, and public options. They also might require some
degree of public accountability for regulators themselves. These considerations
offer a more modem and flexible way of adapting public utility traditions to
contemporary infrastructure. Table 1 below summarizes this modem approach
to infrastructure regulation.

83.

See infra notes 96-97.

84.

See, e.g., Daniel Schwarz, Preventing Regulatory Capture Through Consumer

Empowerment Programs: Some Evidence from Insurance Regulation, in PREVENTING REGULATORY

CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW To LIMIT IT 365 (Daniel Carpenter & David Moss
eds., 2013).
85.
See, e.g., Lisa B. Bingham, The Next Generation of Administrative Law: Building
the Legal Infrastructurefor Collaborative Governance, 2010 WISC. L. REV. 297, 350-56 (proposing
language for a new Federal executive order that would prioritize management of collaborative and
participatory processes).
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Table 1: From Historical Public Utility Regulation to Modem Infrastructural
Regulation
Issue

Conventional
public utility regulation

Modified "infrastructural
regulation"

Natural monopolies with
concentrated private control
(e.g. railroads)

Goods exhibiting scale,
necessity, vulnerability (e.g.
ISPs, finance, information
platforms)

Regulatory tools

Rate regulation,
municipalization
nationalization

Oversight, firewalls, public
options

Regulatory

Public-interested
administrators

Accountable agencies with
stakeholder representation and
more direct participation

What goods and
services should be

/

covered?

institutions

But what would this look like concretely? The next Part outlines in brief
some illustrative examples of these infrastructure regulatory regimes in action.
III. Regulating Infrastructure: Some Examples
The discussion thus far has focused at a fairly abstract level, sketching out
three questions that modem-day regulation of infrastructure, broadly construed,
will have to answer: first diagnosing cases of problematic, unaccountable control
over infrastructure; second choosing from a range of regulatory strategies
including oversight, structuralist restraints, and public options to address these
concerns; and third, addressing parallel questions about regulatory failure and
capture. But how would these questions apply in practice? This Part sketches in
brief some examples of modem-day public utility-style regulatory debates,
which all revolve around the questions framed in Part II above. The purpose of
these examples is not to outline a detailed blueprint for regulation in these
different policy areas. Rather, the goal is to highlight the importance of
approaching these questions through the lens of "infrastructure," applying the
kinds of public utility-style approaches outlined above.86

86.
The case studies below are drawn from, and explored in greater detail in, Rahman,
The New Utilities, supra note 9, at 127-46, and Rahman, InfrastructuralExclusion, supra note 9 at 17-30.
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A. Regulating Economic Infrastructure:Net Neutrality and BroadbandAccess
The public utility tradition and the modem-day framework for regulation
of infrastructure help explain the already-existing legal and policy debates over
broadband access and net neutrality. In this domain, scholars and policymakers
have been developing proposals that in effect express the very public utility and
infrastructural concerns outlined in Parts I and II above. Highlighting the utilitylike nature of these debates is thus helpful both to explain the contours of these
debates and to clarify the nature of the stakes involved.
As suggested in Part I above, telecom has long been a central application
of public utility concepts going back to the nineteenth century. Under Title II of
the 1934 Communications Act, the FCC maintains public utility style regulations
including
rate
regulations
and nondiscrimination
provisions
for
"telecommunications services." In the 1990s, the FCC initially classified highspeed Internet service providers (ISPs) as "broadband services" which were not
subject to Title II obligations." But as the Internet gradually became more
widespread and commercialized, a growing number of advocacy organizations
became increasingly concerned that powerful private corporations like Verizon
or Comcast would be able to exploit their control over end-user access to Internet
content in order to block some types of content while accelerating others.
Furthermore, these firms could charge excessively high prices as a result of their
monopoly control over access to the Internet." These dangers are even more
troubling given our modem context where access to the Internet is increasingly
essential for access to the digital public sphere of information and political
debate, and for accessing economic opportunities.89
Broadband intemet services thus exemplify a modem-day form of
infrastructure as defined in Section II.A above: they operate at scale, are
increasingly an economic and social necessity, and place end users in a
problematic position of vulnerability to the whims of private service providers,
particularly the ISPs. This growing importance of intemet access raised the
stakes for the policy debates over internet regulation. Many of the policy battles
effectively turn over utility-style proposals to assure the accountability of ISPs
and the need to ensure fair and equal access to the internet.
First, the net neutrality debate is essentially a battle over expanding utilitystyle regulatory oversight by the FCC over ISPs in an attempt to prevent
discriminatory treatment of content. The concern here is that ISPs will engage in

87.

Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Serv., 545 U.S. 967, 987-9,

88.

See, e.g., SUSAN P. CRAWFORD, CAPTIVE AUDIENCE (2013).

1000-1(2005).
89.
See Nat'l Econ. Council & Council of Econ. Advisors, Community-Based
BroadbandSolutions: The Benefits of Competition and Choicefor Community Development and Highspeed Internet Access, EXEC. OFF. PRESIDENT (Jan. 2015), http://muninetworks.org/sites
/www.muninetworks.org/files/White-House-community-based-broadband-report-by-executive-officeof-the-president 1.pdf[http://perma.cc/2Z7J-Z37Q].
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"paid prioritization"-the more rapid and preferential transmission of data for
higher-paying content producers-or "blocking" and "throttling"-the subtle
degradation of data transmission to limit access to disfavored content. 90
First, the FCC described the problem of net neutrality as one of private
power that created problematic vulnerabilities for end-users. ISPs like Verizon
and Comcast already had the ability and the incentive to slow down user access
to competing services like VOIP companies such as Vonage, or to speed up
access to services which entered into lucrative contracts with the ISPs themselves
in exchange for faster service as Netflix attempted to do-so-called "paid
prioritization." As the FCC moved to implement net neutrality regulations
preventing these practices through its Open Internet Orders of 2011 and 2015, it
framed its proposals in these very terms of assuring access to vital infrastructure,
and preventing the exploitation and exclusion of content users and producers. 9
Repeated litigation by ISPs like Verizon and Comcast aimed to stop these
regulatory requirements, claiming they were an overreach of FCC authority
beyond the scope of its statutory powers; these arguments carried some sway
with the courts until eventually the FCC formally reclassified ISPs as
"telecommunications" service subject to the common carrier requirements under
Title II of the Communications Act.92 Once this reclassification was
accomplished, the courts upheld the FCC's imposition of net neutrality
regulations, a modem-day common carriage requirement for intemet
infrastructure.93
Second, a growing chorus of anti-monopoly activists, consumer advocacy
groups, and scholars have raised concerns about media mergers that might create
greater potential for conflicts of interest, leading to more discriminatory,
prioritizing, and extractive practices on the part of cable and ISP companies to
favor their own co-owned content producers. Thus, critics of the recent ComcastNBC merger have continued to raise concerns, while the proposed Time WarnerAT&T merger is raising similar worries. 94 Should these mergers be blocked, this
would represent a return to the kinds of structuralist firewalling discussed above,

90.
See, e.g., Michael Powell, PreservingInternetFreedom: GuidingPrinciplesfor the
Industry, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH. TECH. L. 5 (2004); Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband
Discrimination,2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141 (2003).
91.
See, e.g., Preserving the Open Internet ("Open Internet Order"), 76 Fed. Reg.
59,192, 59194-95 (Sept. 23, 2011); id. at 59,198.
92.
See Verizon v FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (DC Cir 2014) (halting the 2011 Open Internet
Order, not on substantive grounds, but as outside the FCC's authority so long as ISPs were not subject to
Title II); Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (invalidating an initial FCC rule banning
the practice of blocking and throttling).
93.
See U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
94.
See, e.g., Joe Flint, Comcast-NBC UniversalMerger Draws Criticism, L.A. TIMES
(June 22, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jun/22/business/la-fi-ct-fcc-20100622 [http://perma.cc
/V4JB-6WTP]; Jim Zarroli, AT&T-Time Warner ProposedMerger Is Compared to Comcast Deal, NPR
(Oct. 24, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/10/24/499121029/at-t-time-warner-proposed-merger-iscompared-to-comcast-deal [http://perma.cc/3CYR-PDAZ].
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a prophylactic limiting of problematic incentives by restricting the corporate
structures of intemet and media infrastructure companies.
Third, state and city officials have sought to affirmatively expand access to
the intemet by employing another public utility-style regulatory strategy:
creating a public option ISP through municipal broadband. Cities like
Chattanooga, Tennessee sought to provide its own public broadband service on
an affordable basis, affirmatively focused on reaching under-invested
communities. 5
B. Regulating PrivatizedInfrastructure:The Case of Water Utilities
If the net neutrality and intemet access debate represent an extension of
public utility style concerns to develop new regulations to address the problem
of private control over internet infrastructure, the growing crisis over water
access in cities like Flint, Michigan, represents an example of how these
infrastructural regulation considerations can also inform efforts to revamp
failures of public control over urban infrastructure.
In April 2013, the city of Flint, which was already placed under Michigan's
emergency management regime after years of budget crises and impending
municipal bankruptcy, switched from its long-standing arrangement with the
Detroit Water and Sewerage Department (DWSD) to a regional water authority.
While waiting for the new authority and its water infrastructure was up and
running, the city temporarily began drawing water from the Flint River. But, to
contain costs, the city did not treat the Flint River water source with anticorrosion agents. Like many midcentury industrial towns, Flint's underlying
pipe infrastructure included many lead-based materials. Without the anticorrosion agents, the new water corroded the lining of the pipes themselves,
leading to a dramatic increase in lead levels within the city's drinking water. The
resultant humanitarian, environmental, and health crisis has already led to
criminal charges for former Flint public officials.9 6
Water seems to be a clear example of an infrastructural good, exhibiting
the characteristics of scale, downstream use, and vulnerability. The large
investments required to maintain, upgrade, and expand water systems and types
suggest the kind of scale effects and sunk costs that characterize utilities. Water
is an essential requirement for healthy families and communities, without which
other types of social and economic well-being are impossible. Furthermore, as
the experience of Flint residents indicates, our dependence on water and on the
water service providers places us in a unique position of vulnerability to the

95.
See Micah Singleton, Tennessee City that Fought Comcast and Won Announces
10Gbps Internet, VERGE (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.theverge.com/2015/10/15/9543839/chattanoogatennessee-just-found-out-its-getting-the-fastest-internet [http://perma.cc/7YWH-ATFH].
96.
Kennedy, supra note 5.
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decisions of the providers themselves, whether they are privatized entities or
governmental agencies.
But the problem in the water context is just one of private control over
infrastructure; it is also one of failures of public authorities: The Flint city
administration, the water utility, the Michigan Department of Environmental
Quality, to name a few. Here, the other public utility regulatory considerations
sketched above can help inform these debates.
First, the regulatory bodies here could be reformed to be more accountable
and responsive. Courts have rejected constitutional challenges to require oneperson-one-vote electoral accountability for special districts and water utilities.97
However, scholars have suggested alternative electoral arrangements that could
be established through statutory and administrative means going beyond
property-based voting as currently required for such quasi-governmental
bodies.98 In addition to electoral accountability, greater forms of stakeholder
representation could facilitate more responsive administration of water utilities.
Flint itself has created a new position for a dedicated city "health officer,"
responsible for negotiating with other state-level authorities to ensure safety of
the water and public health infrastructure.99 More generally, such "proxy
advocacy" could be incorporated more widely through the design of water
utilities to incorporate consumer and community representatives more
systematically.'
Second, "structuralist" regulatory policies could help address the potential
conflicts of interest arising from the increasingly frequent privatization of water
facilities in many cities outside of the Flint context. Given the realities of
privatization and "government by contract," 0 1

scholars have suggested the

implementation of public law standards of accountability through procurement
offices and outsourcing contracts. These contracts could include requirements to
meet benchmarks of service provision and safety, while also requiring
transparency, public participation, third-party monitoring, and other
accountability mechanisms.1 02
97.
See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
98.
See Thomas Merrill, Direct Voting by Property Owners, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 275
(2010); see also Camille Pannu, Drinking Water and Exclusion: A Case Study from California's Central
Valley, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 223 (2012) (critiquing the fragmentation and insulation of water districts). For
a similar critique of municipal utility districts in Texas, see Sara C. Galvan, Wrestling with MUDs to Pin
Down the Truth About Special Districts, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041 (2007).
99.
Interviews with Ford Foundation Staff (Nov. 2017). The health officer position was
created last year drawing resources from philanthropic donors like the Ford Foundation to cover staff
salary and administrative costs. This remains an early experiment in direct government capacity-building.
100.
See, e.g., Schwarz, supra note 84.
101.
On the larger pattern of privatization and possible solutions to it, see, for example,
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Jody Freeman & Martha
Minow eds., 2009), 1-22.
102.
See Alfred C. Aman, Jr. & Joseph C. Dugan, The Human Side ofPublic-Private
Partnerships: From New Deal Regulation to Administrative Law Management, 102 IOWA L. REV. 883
(2017); Laura Dickinson, Public Values/Private Contract, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT:
OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 101, at 335-62.
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Conclusion: A Generalizable Approach to Regulating Infrastructure
There are many kinds of infrastructural goods and services that together
make possible much of our modem economic, social, and political life. As new
forms of infrastructure emerge, public policy has to keep up to assure fair and
equal access to these infrastructural goods and to prevent those controlling the
terms of access to these goods from leveraging that control to extract greater
rents, discriminate in access, or exclude unfairly.
The history of public utility regulation offers a set of ideas that, properly
adapted and updated, can inform a wide range of regulatory challenges arising
from different types of infrastructure. Where historically we might be used to
thinking of public utility regulation narrowly as exemplified by rate regulation
and railroad commissions of the late nineteenth century, a fuller appreciation of
the public utility tradition reveals that reformers of the industrializing economy
had a much more fluid and flexible conception of public utility. The central
problem for them was the need to constrain unaccountable power which, when
exercised through the control of vital infrastructure upon which society depends
for economic and social well-being, posed an especially dangerous threat to
opportunity, inclusion, and economic freedom.
Modem day policymakers must ask three questions. First, which goods are
so critical that they constitute modem day "infrastructure," and thus warrant
greater regulatory scrutiny? Second, what regulatory strategies and tools do we
have to assure fair and equal access to these vital goods and services? Third,
what institutional and policy designs might we employ to ensure that the
administrators of these policies operate in an accountable and responsive
manner? The framework in Part II above offers a way to approach these
questions, through a modernized adaptation of historical public utility concepts.
The examples in Part III illustrate how this approach can provide a flexible and
adaptable approach that can elucidate real on-the-ground policy debates
concerning infrastructural goods today, from intemet access to water. As this
Essay indicates, these questions can help identify a wider range of infrastructural
goods and services where unaccountable control raises public policy concerns.
This approach also provides a more flexible set of policies and institutional tools
through which these concerns can be met (see Table 1 above).
The applications of this infrastructural regulatory frameworks extend even
further. As scholars in this very symposium and in parallel literatures highlight,
public utility concepts are useful in a range of contexts: electricity and carbon
change;10 3 healthcare and the social safety net;' 04 finance and the problem of toobig-to-fail finance;0 5 and the new informational platforms of the intemet

103.
Boyd, supra note 9.
104.
Bagley, supra note 9.
105.
Rahman, The New Utilities, supranote 9, at 136-47 (describing recent debates over
financial regulation and too-big-to-fail banking as a modem-day application of public utility concepts).
As I suggested in this earlier Article, a number of financial regulation scholars have framed the challenge
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economy like Google and Facebook.1 06 As our economy continues to transform,
creating new forms of infrastructure-and also new forms of power, instability,
and inequality these flexible tools will be increasingly vital to assuring fair and
equal access to foundational goods and services. As the industrial revolution
created new economic opportunities but also new economic threats that had to
be tamed and channeled into equitable and productive uses, so too is our modem
twenty-first century economy creating an urgent need for policymakers to adapt
their tools to ensure productive and inclusive access to modem social and
economic infrastructure.

of systemic risk and TBTF finance as essentially a problem of public utility style regulation of the modern
financial infrastructure. See e.g., MEHRSA BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS: EXCLUSION,
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Markets: Toward a Developmental Finance State, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 103, 160-74 (2015); Robert
Hockett & Saule Omarova, 'Special, " Vestigial, or Visionary? What Bank Regulation Tells US About the
Corporation-andVice Versa, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 453, 461 (2016) (describing the chartered publicprivate nature of corporations in general, and banking in particular); Roberta Karmel, Is the Public Utility
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the InsurableInterestDoctrine to 21" Century FinancialMarkets, 107 Nw. L. REV. 1307 (2017); Rahman,
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90 TUL. L. REV. 1241 (2016).
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(2017); Jack Balkin, Free Speech in an Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private Governance, and New
School Speech Regulation, U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2018); Lina Khan, Note, Amazon's Antitrust
Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 564 (2017); Kate Klonick, The New Governors, 131 HARV. L. REV (forthcoming
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